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THEORY OF NAMES

I. Anonymi

The name of a man is like his shadow. It is not of his substance and not of his soul, but it lives with him and by him. Its presence is not vital, nor its absence fatal. If a man were to move in perennial darkness, he would have no shadow, and if he were content to dwell in solitude, he would need no name. Adelbert von Chamisso's story tells of Peter Schlemihl who sold his shadow for an inexhaustible purse. To his fellow men he became an object of scorn and contempt, of pity and ridicule and fear, and never again did he live a happy day. Finally a fortunate accident let him find a pair of sevenleague boots which carried him quickly through the world in quest of the unseen, thus affording him a restless satisfaction of adventure and excitement. The story of the man who sold his name and thereafter remained nameless has not been written and probably never will be. For perpetual anonymity cannot be made believable, not even in a fairy tale. (Ὁστις 'Nobody' in Homer's Odyssey is no exception.) A man might be deprived of his shadow, and would be in no position to replace it. But if he were robbed of his name by a malign sorcerer, and stricken with amnesia, he would still not have to go through life nameless. He could invent an appellation for himself; and even if he were deprived of the faculty of speech, or of human intelligence altogether, a name would without fail be imposed on him by others.

There are tales in ancient writers of persons without names — not just of single individuals, but of entire ethnic groups afflicted by this calamity, although to them it seemed no shortcoming. Herodotus describes the inhabitants of the deep interior of North Africa as ἄθρωποι ... τούτης ὄνομα ἑστὶ Ἀτάραντες οἱ ἄνωνοι εἰς μόνοι ἄθρόπων τῶν ἀμεῖας ὑμεῖς ¹. The same phenomenon is reported by Pliny: "Atlantes degeneres sunt humani ritus, si credimus, nam neque nominum ullorum inter ipsos appellatio est ..."². We know of no people or race in the world today among whom the usage of proper names in some form is totally lacking. It is most unlikely that in the days of Herodotus and Pliny a state of

¹ Herodotus 4. 184: "...people... who are called Atarantes, who are the only nameless human beings we know." (Unless otherwise indicated, the translations are mine throughout.)
² Plinius, Hist. Nat. 5. 8. 45: "The Atlantes are a lower order of men, if we can believe the report, for they have no names for one another..."
anonymity prevailed anywhere as part of an ethnical, cultural heritage. The testimony of these authors must belong in the realm of myth. Either they had misunderstood or misconstrued a traveler’s tale, or they had become victims of their own gullibility. Pliny, cautiously, does not forget to insert *si credimus* ‘if we believe’. However, as the reader goes on, his credulity is further taxed. For reputedly these strange people had no dreams, which is preposterous; they ate nothing “living,” which is hardly noteworthy if taken literally, absurd if it includes all animal and vegetable food derived from organisms that once were alive; they heaped abuse upon the sun that devoured everything with its fiery rays, which is in contradiction, at least, to the widespread adoration of the sun as a life-giving deity. In such company, the report of namelessness may be properly discounted. While Homer possessed no wider factual knowledge of the peoples of the world than the later Herodotus and Pliny, his own statement has for us a much more persuasive and credible ring:

> Οὐ μὲν γὰρ τις πάμπαν ἄνωνυμοι ἦστε ἀνθρώποι,
> οὐ κακοὶ οὐδὲ μὲν ἐθύμοι, ἔπει χλη πρόπτα γένηται,
> ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν θευματι, ἐπεὶ καὶ τέχνωσι, τοιῆς.

Whatever the facts, none of these authors wished to leave any doubt in the reader’s mind that, in his opinion, the lack of proper names is, or would betoken, a shockingly low state of human civilization.

Among the Greeks and the Romans, slaves bore no names sometimes, it is said. This too must be taken with a grain of salt. No doubt a slave, in particular, was likely to be called often. A meaningless shout is, especially from the master’s point of view, unsatisfactory, since neither the person thus summoned, nor indeed anyone, might respond. And if the owner of several slaves develops a series of distinctive shouts, say, “Hey”, “Ho”, and “Hi”, habitually employed to address three different persons, then these persons’ names are Hey, Ho, and Hi. What is termed anonymity with reference to slaves in antiquity is often due to the fact that, imported from some strange, most likely barbarous lands of Asia Minor, or the shores of the Black Sea, or Africa, they had lost their human identity because of their station, and that they were no longer called by the names, possibly not pronounceable to a Roman or a Greek, by which their families and their countrymen had hitherto addressed them. Besides, as long as they were not Roman citizens, the law did

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3 Homer, Od. 8. 552–554: “For no one, whether of low or high degree, goes nameless once he has come into the world; everybody is named by his parents the moment he is born.”
not permit them to bear the official Roman *tria nomina* ‘three names’, without which they were, legally, indeed nameless. They were often designated and addressed simply by the name of their country of origin. This with all the more reason since their provenance often determined their market value\(^4\). Similarly, the emancipation of American Negroes at the close of the Civil War left most of those who had been slaves without names in the conventional sense and form. They adopted the names of their onetime masters (as Roman slaves used to do upon manumission), or other surnames known to them. (Hence the great majority of American Negroes bear English or Scottish or Irish, rather than African or other foreign, family names.) But it cannot be said that slaves had no names at all, although they may have lacked for sociological reasons the conventional names of the communities in which they lived. Among the Ostyaks, in the wastes of Siberia, it was allegedly the custom not to give daughters any names, undoubtedly because of the small social importance of the female. Ostyaks call, or at any rate called, their wives simply *imi* ‘woman’\(^5\). Such extraordinary factual anonymity is paralleled in other societies by a nomenclature of women at least different from that of men\(^6\), or by women’s legal, though not factual, anonymity in Rome. In the Roman state women’s names were altogether different from those of men, who alone were full citizens; they were not composed of the usual *tria nomina*, and even the oldest type of appellation, the praenomen, did not coincide in form and usage with the male praenomen\(^7\).

Since the giving and bearing of names have found such universal acceptance in all forms of societies and in all stages of culture, this fact of universality ought to be indicative of a common need, perhaps even of a common urge, which all human beings share.

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\(^5\) Richard Andree, Ethnographische Parallelen und Vergleiche (Stuttgart 1878) 339.


II. The act of naming

The axiom, No language no man, no man no language, is true by definition. Whatever creature has not the faculty of speech, that is, both the mental aptitude and the physical apparatus for uttering articulate sounds with certain conventional meanings attached to them, cannot justly be called human (pathological offspring of human beings are excluded); and any normal human being commands, as his human heritage, the power of the spoken word. Non-articulate vocal utterances of non-human living beings are mere noises, cries, grunts, which, although they may convey a simple message, are not speech. Whether the first utterances of human speech were of an infinitive, imperative, nominal, or any other nature is a question best left to the glottogonists. Most likely they were whole utterances, or sentences, even though they may have consisted of but one single free form. Hence our grammatical terminology would be senseless anyhow when we deal with this protospeech.

Curiously enough, biblical tradition records the origin of at least part of the human vocabulary as the result of a naming process:  "And out of the ground the Lord God formed every beast of the field, and every fowl of the air; and brought them unto Adam to see what he would call them: and whatsoever Adam called every living creature, that was the name thereof." Thus man proper-named each creature, and this proper name remained attached thereafter to the species.

It would appear, then, that by a process of abstraction, generalization, and classification language evolved a type of word commonly called appellativum, which is a common proper name, consistently and naturally developed. The designation 'common proper name' may contain, at first sight, a contradiction in terms. "If a special grammatical term must be found for surnames, Latin gentile names, and examples like Μῆλος, Πέρσης, probably the most appropriate name would be 'common proper names'". In other words, it is a proper name on the

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8 G. Révész, Ursprung und Vorgeschichte der Sprache (Bern 1946), distinguishes between Kontaktlaute, Zuruf and Anruf, and Wort, called Vorbedingung, Vorphasen and Frühphasen, and gesellschaftliche Phase of speech, respectively. »Erbliekt man im Pithecanthropus erectus oder in irgendeiner früheren Species der menschähnlichen Affen den Vorfahren des Menschen, so bleibt noch immer die Frage offen, ob jener Übergangstypus mit Sprachfunktion begaht gewesen sei oder nicht. Müßte diese Frage bejaht werden, ... dann müssen wir sagen, daß der Pithecanthropus eben ein Mensch gewesen war. Fiele die Antwort negativ aus, so war er ein Affe und kein Mensch." (P. 249)

9 Genesis 2:19. Some more devout linguists of the past who insisted that language was a gift of God should at least have restricted their doctrine of divine dispensation to the faculty of speech, for the material of language was apparently created by man!  

way toward fulfilling the function of a common noun. This is no longer a pure proper name, some think, since, for example, Claudii, or les Boileau, or the Smiths, does not unmistakably designate an individuum, nor is intended to do so. They are class names, although they are not quite common nouns, since they are not apt to, nor meant to, express any resemblance of the bearers capable of abstraction, as do common nouns of the type horse, tree; they are not “bound together by palpable resemblances which might be summed up in an abstract term horiness or horsehood. . . . . about different Boileaus and Claudii there is no corresponding resemblance that could be summed up as Boileaneness or Claudinesshood11. Even community of blood is not implied, since one might become a Boileau by marriage and a Claudius by adoption.”12 A common proper name, therefore, takes chronologically (in terms of origin) and semantically a medial position between proper name and common noun; it is the stage through which names pass, as we shall see, to become nouns13.

Great efforts have been made to differentiate by definition proper names as a class from common nouns. Genetically such differentiation would seem unjustified, since common nouns, before acquiring their generic function, must have fulfilled the task of proper-naming. It will be best to compare their respective functions and performances in language.

In Bloomfield’s scheme of the response to a stimulus mediated by speech, whereby the response to a stimulus may be transferred by means of a linguistic utterance to a receiver outside the person receiving the original stimulus, the place between r and s represents the speech act14.

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\begin{align*}
S \rightarrow r \quad \ldots \ldots \ldots \quad S \rightarrow R \\
S = \text{stimulus} \quad s = \text{substitute stimulus} \\
R = \text{response} \quad r = \text{substitute response}
\end{align*}
\]

The task of this linguistic performance is threefold15: expression (it expresses the state of the speaker), appeal (it appeals to the listener), and re-presentation (it re-presents facts, real or imagined or desired). In other words, the speech act is a symptom of the state of the speaker, a signal for the listener, and a substitute symbol for the facts. Any noun may, by itself, be sufficient to discharge this triple task. A shout “Fire!” is a symptom, a signal, and a symbol. If a common noun is equal to this complex performance, is a name also?

11 See below, p. 40.
12 Gardiner, l.c. 22.
13 See below, pp. 20ff.
15 I am following the terminology of Karl Bühler, Sprachtheorie (Jena 1934).
If the name “John” is uttered, it is a symptom of some mental process in the speaker’s brain, a signal for a male human to behave in a certain manner, and a symbol for that human male and for the circumstances in which he is involved at the moment and to which some reaction is demanded of him. Hence the utterance of a name can fulfill adequately the task of linguistic communication, functioning in the same manner as does a noun. Also on linguistic functional grounds, therefore, a grammatical distinction between noun and name is not legitimate. At least it is not indispensable, though it may be convenient.

In spite of all this, everyone who masters one or more than one language feels that there is a very decided difference between a substantive and a name. Indeed, their being shown to be genetically and linguistically equivalent does not seem to furnish a satisfactory reason for abandoning a well-established habitual contrast. But wherein that contrast lies will have to be clarified.

III. What’s in a name?

Often when one encounters a name in a foreign, especially an exotic, tongue, one likes to ask just what that name “means”, taking for granted somehow that, more often than not, an answer is possible. Significantly enough, with names taken from idioms usually identified with Western civilization, the query as to the meaning of a name occurs less frequently. Speakers of Western languages, in view of the prevailing semantic intransparency of the names in their several vernaculars, have resigned themselves to the fact that a large number of personal names do not mean anything in terms of current vocabulary. But they have also learned to expect that Eastern and “primitive” names are often translatable into meaningful words or phrases.

Since genetically a good case can be made for the oneness of what is called noun and name, but also since the Sprachgefühl of the ordinary speaker, unschooled in grammar and linguistics, can very well distinguish a name from a noun (borderline cases excluded), this question imposes itself: What nouns, what kind of nouns, taken from what sphere and having what meanings, have been singled out for the task of providing proper names for a certain ethnic group? The answer is simply that no particular selection takes place, that any noun can be chosen for this function. Of course, the choice will be historically, culturally, and ethnically determined, but potentially any noun can become a name, and not only a noun but also a verbal form, an adverb, a whole sentence, a particle, even a letter. However, since nouns and substantivally used adjectives form the vast majority of names, at least in Indo-European, the evidence gathered below will emphasize substantival derivation.
The chapter on the contents of Indic names in Hilka's work on Sanskrit onomastics offers a good survey of the possibilities. I shall give a concise résumé:\(^{16}\):

1. The realm of the gods
   a. Deva-‘God’ (in compounds)\(^{17}\)
   b. Divine names (in compounds)

2. The realm of nature
   a. Plants
   b. Animals
   c. Minerals
   d. Other elements

3. Time and circumstances of birth
4. Time of life; kinship
5. Geographical situation; ethnic relation
6. Dress; finery
7. Physical appearance; parts of the body
8. Human mind
   a. General attributes
   b. Intelligence or lack of it
   c. Character; temperament

9. Human conditions
   a. Way of life; food
   b. Happiness; luck
   c. Wealth
   d. Joy; love
   e. Activities
      (1) Religion; cult
      (2) Science; philosophy
      (3) Public service

10. Various other concreta
11. Titles (sovereign; honorary)
12. [Women’s names]\(^{18}\)

This is a fairly comprehensive list. It covers a wide variety of details and a great number of semantic variations. If one considers now that whatever linguistic peculiarities appear in Indie are representative of, or at least feasible in, the Indo-European languages, one will have to

\(^{16}\) A. Hilka, l.c. 77 ff.
\(^{17}\) Cf. Greek Ἴδη- ‘God’.
\(^{18}\) Women’s names are assigned to a separate category on account of their special formations and modes of usage. (Cf. above, p. 5.) For peculiarly feminine compound names see Hilka, l.c. 148 ff.
expect a similar, or at any rate not radically different, situation as typically common-Indo-European. (It must be noted here that I am not speaking of the formation of names, whether they are single or compound, simple or complex, but only of their contents, of what is in them.)

In section 1b of the list above, divine names are given as a source of human names. In an appellation of this sort we are dealing, strictly speaking, not with a name from a noun but with a name from a name. We could proceed to interpret the divine name, and reduce it to its meaningful root, e.g. Zeus beside Sanskrit dyaus ‘heaven’, but that would not really explain the formation of the human god-name, which was given to a person without regard for, and most likely in ignorance of, its basic meaning. Another problem is the classification of human names from names of animals and plants, especially the latter. If a woman is called Violet, this is undoubtedly her proper name. But is violet a common noun, or is it the proper name of that little flower?

In any event, among the sources for human names we shall also have to include proper names. In their “Inhaltsübersicht” Fick and Bechtel note three kinds of Greek names; at least that is what appears from their table: 1. “Vollnamen”, 2. “Kurz- oder Kosenamen”, 3. “Namen aus Namen.” Such a tabulation is misleading because it makes one think that Vollnamen, or dithematic names, and Kurznamen, or monothematic and hypocoristic names, are in essence different from the Namen aus Namen. Categories 1 and 2 systematize names according to their form and outer appearance, whereas 3 classifies them after their meaning and content. To combine two principles of classification in one scheme is logically unsound, though the failing will be encountered in a number of the later lists, also. Let us see what sort of names Fick and Bechtel include in their “Namen aus Namen” category:

1. Calendar names; birthday names
   a. Day of month; holiday
   b. Month
   c. Season
2. Dedication names
3. Metaphorical names
   a. Gods; heroes
   b. Realm of nature

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19 Cf. below, pp. 36 f.
20 A. Fick — F. Bechtel, l. c. XV ff.
21 In German called Widmungsnamen, since the bearer is dedicated, or dedicates himself, to the god whose name is contained in his own.
(1) Animals  
(2) Plants  
(3) Inanimate objects  
c. Collective names  
(1) Ethnic names  
(2) Clan names  
d. Office; profession

This chart does not differ basically from the classification of Indic names by Hilka; the two correspond largely even in detail.

Next we may consider Latin cognomina. A count has been made of the cognomina contained in the Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum, Vol. 1, and all of Livy. From it are culled the following nine classes, according to content:

1. Physical peculiarities  
2. Character  
3. Family relations  
4. Office; occupation  
5. Objects; animals; etc.  
6. Localities  
7. Other Latin names  
8. Foreign names  
9. Words of unknown signification (numerically smallest class)

This is, apart from technical details of classification, again the same type of chart as those constructed for Sanskrit and Greek.  

A peculiar custom of Greek and Roman days, which became strongly prevalent especially during the later years of the Roman Empire, during its decline, was the addition of a signum, a byname, to one's name. It seems that the fashion originated in the eastern lands of the Empire, in Egypt, Syria, Asia Minor, that is, in bilingual areas where the native population had to accommodate itself to the speech habits of its masters. At first the natives translated their names, for convenience, into Greek.

The cognomen is chosen because, among Latin name classes, it is the most mobile, the least sterile. Praenomina and gentilicia tend to be petrified by tradition, and to decrease in number. Cognomina are functionally closest to what we understand by proper name; they are the most individualistic.


or Latin; later they simply adopted Greek or Latin names, which, though they were made to fit the phonemic structure of their own languages, lacked all etymological connection with them; and finally some persons added a name to their own, a sort of nickname, which in the course of time replaced their "real" name, particularly since it tended to be the liveliest and most distinctive part of the appellation. Of the nicknames of this sort prevalent in Asia Minor, the following semantic origins are given:

1. Plants
2. Animals
3. Inanimate objects
4. Adjectives
5. Profession
6. Place of origin of bearer
7. Kinship

The types occurring, at a later date, in the western part of the Empire, are thus classified by Hélène Wuilleumier:

1. Individual names
   a. Place of origin of bearer
   b. Physical appearance
   c. Function
   d. Other names
   e. Character
   f. God; religion

2. Collective names
   a. Ethics
   b. Life after death
   c. Religious, philosophical belief

During the Dark Ages, accompanying and following the collapse of the Roman Empire, there occurred, as in many other aspects of civilization, a complete break also in the habits of naming practiced by the Romans. The frontiers of the Empire buckled and broke; Germanic tribes overran central, western and southern Europe; Mongolian hordes occupied eastern Europe and on occasion advanced as far as Gaul. Roman institutions and laws everywhere were shattered by the invaders. The individual

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25 Compare the more or less successful attempts at Americanization of their names by immigrants to the United States, particularly by those persons whose names are too difficult for speakers of English to pronounce and by those who find their names ugly or odious or socially inadequate, for a variety of reasons.
27 Lambertz, Gl. 5 (1913) 131.
28 Wuilleumier, l. c. 582.
29 For the special significance of these see Wuilleumier, l. c. 597.
30 The influence of Christianity makes itself felt in this last category.
was torn loose from a larger social unit and was thus deprived of, among
other things, his standing as a citizen of a world power, and, with it,
all those rights and privileges and duties which “belonging” had entailed:
taxation, registration, conscription, census, education. Therefore, the
former Roman citizen, particularly the man of the provinces, throwing
off the shackles of regimentation (which had grown lighter of late in
any event), also ceased to feel the necessity for the legally fixed tria
nomina, or any other traditional kind of name. Besides, the members
of the less civilized invading tribes which were assuming control bore
as a rule but a single individual name, and certainly had no legally
determined family name. One name was sufficient because their organi-
zational, social units were smaller, more loosely integrated, and ad-
ministered in a much less complex fashion. Single names instead of the
Roman tria nomina became prevalent everywhere in former Roman
territory.
When the great upheaval was drawing to a close and societies proceeded
once more from tribal to national organizations, the need for additional
names, besides the individual names, for the surer identification of
individuals became pressing. It is obvious that the smaller the social
unit, the smaller the number of distinctive names needed to differentiate
its members. An increase in the complexities of the administrative and
social constitution of an ethnic or political group tends to produce, as a
rule, an increase in the complexity and rigidity of the onomastic system.
Hence, in the later Middle Ages there arose the necessity of creating new
names. First, a nickname (used here in the etymological and wider sense
of an ekename ‘a byname’) was attached to a person, and disappeared
with that person’s death. Later, nicknames became hereditary and
passed from father to son, a process which obliterated the signification
of personal nicknames, but which produced the modern family name.
I do not want to trace this new development in detail\(^\text{31}\); what interests
us at the moment is the semantic content of these new names.
A chart based on the names contained in the tax rolls of 1292 and 1313
and in other contemporary documents of the city of Paris shows the
following types of name derivation\(^\text{32}\):
1. Place names
2. Office; profession

\(^{31}\) See E. Pulgram, Historisch-soziologische Betrachtung des modernen Familiennamens.
BzN. 2 (1950/51) 132–165.

\(^{32}\) See R. Pachnio, Die Beinamen der Pariser Steuerrolle von 1292 unter Heranziehung
der Steuerrolle von 1313 und zahlreicher Urkunden (Dissertation Königsberg 1909).
Cf. also K. Michaelsson, Etudes sur les noms de personnes français d’après les rôles de
la taille parisiens. Uppsala Universitets Årsskrift 4 (Uppsala 1927).
3. Animals; plants; minerals
4. Implements; tools
5. Food and drink
6. Abstracta; inanimate objects
7. Physical peculiarities
8. Character; temperament
9. Dress; finery
10. Property; wealth
11. Occupation; habits; outstanding adventures
12. Relation to God
13. Habitual or striking utterances

The dissertation by Pachnio containing this list appeared one year prior to Hilka's work on Indic names. If Hilka knew it, he omitted it from an otherwise very rich and commendable bibliography. However, the extensive coincidences are no matter of surprise: Do not the facts themselves coincide?

The Germanic languages, many of whose speakers found themselves constrained, in the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth centuries, to devise personal names, follow exactly the same paths. We may roughly distinguish the following sources for German family names:

1. Personal qualities (expressed by adjectives or nouns)
2. Animals; plants
3. Food and drink
4. Dress; implements
5. Profession; calling
6. Seasons; days; natural phenomena
7. Descriptive sentences
8. Habitual phrases (of persons to be named)

As for English, the surnames may be divided into the following semantic classes according to their derivation from:

1. Patronymics
2. Place names
3. Office
4. Occupation
5. Sobriquets or nicknames

33 Hilka, l. c. 1–4, 152–160, passim in footnotes.
34 A. Bähnisch, Die deutschen Personenamen (3rd ed. Leipzig 1929) 60.
36 A more detailed classification may be found in C. L'Estrange Ewen, A Guide to the Origin of British Surnames (London 1938) 98. Otherwise this book must be used with
Similar information can be derived from an examination of Slavic names\(^{37}\).

Not all names are old. The process of naming and nameforming never stops. And especially in the matter of given names certain nations or groups within a nation, particularly during the past century, have allowed imagination free rein\(^ {38}\). Only a century and a half ago a mass distribution of family names among European Jews became necessary because the Jews had never had names conforming to the laws and customs of the several nations in which they dwelt\(^ {39}\). Their new names, too, are derived from all the categories previously mentioned for other units. Another group of persons living until comparatively recently on the fringes of the society of which they were actually an integral part were the inhabitants of remote Alpine districts of Austria. Among them a hereditary family name was, even in the nineteenth century, by no means as commonplace as one might think. And when the necessity of a census and of the compilation of vital statistics finally penetrated into even the least accessible mountain villages, these folk, too, had to acquire suitable surnames. It was the task of the schoolmaster, the Waldschulmeister, to act as census taker, and also, in some instances, as the creator of names. I think I could do no better than to let the Waldschulmeister himself speak, because his words constitute practically a résumé of all that has been said concerning name-giving, particularly in Indo-European.

In the autumn, 1816. During one of the past weeks I have made the rounds of all the huts in the forest, with a sheet of paper in my hands. I have asked the family fathers concerning their economic status, the size of their families, and the birthdates and names of the children. The year of birth can be indicated, for the most part, only after events and caution. I recommend it as an example of how certain books, ostensibly written on onomastics, make the pseudoscientific glorification of (some, not all) names, combined with a sizable portion of genealogy, their principal topic. In such works onomastics is debased to become the handmaiden of the kind of genealogy which seeks to prove that certain names are "good old" names, an enterprise of great importance to snobs.


\(^{39}\) Cf. G. Kessler, Die Familiennamen der Juden in Deutschland (Leipzig 1935).
circumstances\textsuperscript{40}. This one was born in the summer of the great flood; that other has come into the world during the very winter when it was necessary to eat bread made from straw. Such happenings are important milestones.

The list of names will not show much variety. The inhabitants of the male sex are called Hannes or Sepp or Berthold or Toni or Mathes\textsuperscript{41}; the womenfolk are named Kathrein or Maria; the latter name is changed and comes out as Mini, Mirzel, Mili, Mirz, Marz. It goes similarly with other names, and if someone comes in from the outside he has to tolerate a change of name to suit the tongues of the natives\textsuperscript{42}. As for myself, they called me Andredl for a while, but that seemed to them too robust a name for such a little fellow, and today I am just Redl.

Very few know anything about family names. Many may have lost theirs, forgotten them; others may never have had one\textsuperscript{43}. People use a peculiar form to indicate their descent and membership in a family. At Hansl-Toni-Sepp's! That is the name of a house, and it is thereby shown that the owner of the house is called Sepp, but that his father was called Toni and his grandfather Hansl\textsuperscript{44}. Take Kathi-Hani-Waba-Mirz-Margareth! There Kathi is the great-great-grandmother of Margaret\textsuperscript{45}. That clan must have been living for a long time in this solitary forest.

In this manner every person is identified, often by half a dozen names, and everyone drags behind himself the rusty chain of his forebears. It is their only heirloom and monument\textsuperscript{46}.

\textsuperscript{40} Cf. names that express such events and conditions in the various charts of names above.

\textsuperscript{41} Compare the relative dearth of Roman praenomina.

\textsuperscript{42} See above, p. 11f., on phonemic assimilation of foreign names.

\textsuperscript{43} The reason for this nonexistence or oblivion of surnames lies obviously in the lack of social necessity for them.

\textsuperscript{44} This usage corresponds exactly with patronymic names so frequent in all areas and languages: Germanic -sen, -son, -sohn; Polish -ski; Russian -off, -ich, -ow; Greek -δυς; Scottish and Irish Mac-, Fitz- (from French fils); O'; Semitic ben, ibn. Most of these prefixes and suffixes originally expressed a father-son relation (as they still do in Russian, for example: Alexander Pavlovich is the son of Pavel, Elena Pavlova is the daughter of Pavel, and father Pavel's own non-inheritable patronymic may be Ivanovich), but have become, in the course of time, unalterable parts of inherited surnames. (In Scandinavian countries this change had to be imposed by law only half a century ago.) However, the names cited by the Waldschulmeister are true patronymics and not inheritable.

\textsuperscript{45} Cf. Sizer, l. c. 34, where the following bits of conversation are recorded to illustrate a similar custom in the mountains of Virginia. "Have you heard that Eas's Bennie has done married Minnie's Lile?"; "Hit's a shame that Eph's Nelson done shot at that schoolteacher"; "Rast's Russell is the father of Noney's Bet's boy."

\textsuperscript{46} For an example from nineteenth-century England, see Pulgram, l. c. n. 12.
But the confusion must not last. The names must be made ready for the parish records; surnames must be invented to go with the Christian names. That won't be so difficult, if one considers the core of the matter. Let the people be called after their qualities, their occupations, their positions; that is easy to remember and retain in the future. I call the lumberjack Paul, who has married Annamirl, no longer Hiesel-Franzel-Paul, but simply Paul Holzer, because he transports tree trunks upon the Riesen down to the Kohlstätten, and because people call that kind of work holzen. A man called Schwammschläger Sepp, who has forgotten his father's name, shall not be called anything but Schwammschläger, and no matter how he and his descendants may put on airs, they will remain the Schwammschläger. A hut in the Lautergräben I call the Brunnhütte, because in front of it runs a big spring. Why call the owner of the hut Hiesel-Michel-Hannes? Let him be Brunnhüter, and let his wife be Brunnhütter, and if his son ever goes out into the great world, to become a soldier or a coachman or no matter what, he will always remain Brunnhüter. We also have a Sturmhanna; he has his house up on top of the stormy Wolfsgrubenhöhe.

For a long time now people have been calling an old, thicknecked dwarf, who is the coal driver Sepp, Kropfjodel. Recently I asked the little man if it would be all right with him if I entered him under the name of Josef Kropfjodel on my sheet. He is quite content with that. I reminded him, however, that his children and his children's children, too, would be called Kropfjodel. So he just grinned and gurgled: "Let him

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47 It must be borne in mind that Rosegger, the author of these lines, was, of course, not a linguist, nor an onomatologist. His choice of surnames is, therefore, in its coincidence with the systems quoted above, most significant, and impresses one with the agelessness and intrinsic humanness of the process.

48 Especially in a society where the occupation or trade passes traditionally from father to son. In the Middle Ages feudalism regulated such succession by law, hence inheritance of nicknames was natural.

49 From Holz 'wood', hence Holzer 'woodsman, lumberjack'.

50 Riesen refers here to special chutes for the transportation of timber.

51 Kohlstätten are the places where charcoal is produced in the Weiler, great heaps of wood which are covered with earth and then ignited through one small opening, so that partial oxidation takes place without burning.

52 Schwamm in this compound stands for Feuerschwamm 'touchwood'.

53 Another name from the bearer's trade. Note Rosegger's awareness that names must become inheritable regardless of the relevancy of their meaning for the generations after the first bearer.

54 Place names have the same genesis as personal names.

55 Name from place name.

56 Name from meteorological peculiarities connected with the bearer's home.

57 Name from physical peculiarity: Kropf means 'goiter'.
be called Kropfjodel a hundred times, that boy of mine!’ And a little later the rogue adds: ‘Well, we got the name now, thank God. I wish we had the boy too!’

Over in the Karwasserschlag stand three big bushy firs, which the forester’s helper Josef-Hansel-Anton let stand for the protection of men and animals. To reward him, the man is now called Anton Schirrmänner for ever and ever.

The new names are finding favor, and whoever hears one holds his head higher and is more hopeful, prouder than he has been before. Now he knows who he is. Now the problem is how to give the new name a good ring and to bear it with honor.

It would be tiresome to continue citing lists of the semantic sources of proper names from various languages. I daresay that the case for Indo-European has been fully stated. Suffice it to add that I have continued my research outside the Indo-European family and have examined Chinese, Arabic, Hebrew, Accadian, several African dialects, and several American Indian dialects, and that the results have been the same throughout. The only difference is that in these languages the meaning contained in names was on the whole more obvious, that consequently no tracing of roots and no etymologizing were needed in order to establish the semantic content of the names. It may also be added that in Semitic languages theophorous sentence names are prevalent. But with all differences in form and the varying emphasis on different lexical areas, any name from any of these linguistic groups can be fitted into the classification of Indic names by Hilka or into any of the other tables.

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58 An honorary name from a good deed performed by the bearer: *Tanne ‘fir’, *schirmen ‘to protect’.

59 This psychological impact of name-bearing upon the bearer is of the greatest importance. It is responsible for all the magic powers ascribed to names, for the solemnity with which Christian baptism and non-Christian name-giving ceremonies are performed, for name taboos, for the intangible honor, pride, value, and sometimes shame, attached to one’s name, and, conversely, for the fear and opprobrium of namelessness. Cf. Edw. Clodd, Magic in Names and Other Things (London 1920); Ch. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, *The Meaning of Meaning* (5th ed. London 1938) 24 ff. and, on onomancy, 36–37; Smith, l. c. 242 ff. See also Shakespeare, Othello III. iii. 155–161:

Good name in man and woman, dear my lord,
Is the immediate jewel of their souls:
Who steals my purse steals trash; ’tis something, nothing;
’Twas mine, ’tis his, and has been slave to thousands;
But he that filches from me my good name
Robbs me of that which not enriches him,
And makes me poor indeed.

I have found no names which ultimately and basically are not part of the current or past lexicon of a language. Names made up of nonsense syllables or a random sequence of sounds (like that of the French linguist Bréal, who allegedly pulled five letters out of a hat containing the alphabet and made his name therefrom, or like the fabricated pseudonyms of artist and actors, or of a single letter (like the s in Harry S. Truman) are rare and can be accounted for as exceptions and oddities. But before closing this chapter on the contents of names, I should like to call attention briefly to those animals which, on account of their intimate association with man for so many centuries, even millennia, have become domesticated, and to those more or less domesticated or tamed animals in circuses and zoos, and sometimes in homes. They are all given names by their human owners and friends, as a rule human names, or at least names which, under certain circumstances, could equally well serve humans. The only difference is that in many cases imagination is given free rein with animals, and the discretion which one feels obliged to employ when naming humans, for the sake of local custom, good taste, or tradition, may be discarded. Among the most-named, so to speak, indeed much over-named, animals are racehorses. A racing form provides a study in exuberance unmatched in other realms of onomastics. But the owners of stables are really in a very difficult position: the name must be unique for every single horse, but it is also desirable that it be lucky, "beautiful", sonorous, flamboyant, and memorable, and that it indicate, if at all possible, the horse's genealogy. The names are, of course, all declarative, even though the meaning, especially in names from names, may remain somewhat obscure, if not altogether incomprehensible, to the ordinary habitué of the track. Racing is a very ancient sport. The Mitanni (ca. 2,000 B.C.), the Greeks and the Romans practiced it. There exists a little treatise on the names of Roman racehorses, from which one derives the information that the animals were named with the following points in view:

1. To augur victory in the race
2. To praise the good qualities of the animal

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61 See P. Chessex, Origine des noms de personnes (Lausanne 1948) 9 ff. and passim; Smith, I. c. 124 ff.
62 In the United States the task of receiving applications for names and of granting names is entrusted to the Jockey Club. Many rules and restrictions govern the naming of racehorses, making it a complicated business for an owner to select a name that may prove acceptable. See the column of A. Daley, "What's in a Name?". New York Times, 25 January 1948, Section 5, p. 2; Louise M. Ackerman, Naming of mags. Names 1 (1953) 262—265.
63 Lambertz, Gl. 4 (1912) 106 ff.
3. To indicate its origin or genealogy
4. To compare it with other (swift) animals, e. g. *Aquila* 'Eagle'
5. To compare it with heroes, historical figures, or gods
6. To describe its appearance
7. To use a human name having, for some reason, desirable associations.

There is nothing in these seven classes that could not be equally characteristic of human names.

I have dwelt on the subject of the contents of names at some length, but although the discussion has been extensive, it has not been, and was not meant to be, exhaustive. Yet even the cursory treatment of several onomastic systems from the single point of view of what the semantic content of a name may be should have illuminated the fact that, not only name-bearing, but also namebuilding is a universal human practice, with the same elementary rules everywhere, just as human language is basically the same physical and nervous performance of human speech production and comprehension, regardless of the multitude and variety of languages.

IV. How names become nouns, and vice versa.

The fact that many proper names have become nouns, or are or will be in the process of becoming such indicates, if further proof is necessary, that proper names, though functionally mainly denotative, must also hold connotative potentials. The latter, by virtue of the renown or notoriety of the bearers of the names, may then prevail over the denotative factors to such an extent that the names come to be used with reference to persons and things other than the originally proper-named, with the function of common nouns. It is indeed their very wealth or intensity of connotations which permits this generalization and abstraction of proper names. Gardiner’s systematization is useful in furnishing a concise survey of possible transitions from name to noun.


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64 For a comprehensive account of this development see B. Migliorini, Dal nome proprio al nome comune (Genève 1927). Although the book deals mainly with Romance languages, a wealth of general information may be gleaned from it.
66 A. H. Gardiner, I. c. 18–19.
67 Note the alternation of majuscules and minuscules in English usage, which is a strong indication of the degree to which a name has become a true noun.
4. Transfer from person to product: a Ford, a Chevrolet, a Chesterfield, a chesterfield\(^\text{68}\), a mackintosh\(^\text{69}\).

In a great many instances the derivation of what we now call a noun from a proper name has been much obscured by radical phonetic change and semantic shift. Few people know that doll is a pet form of Dorothy, like the still recognizable Dot, Dotty. The exact French equivalent is marionette, a double hydrositic from Marie. Weekley infers from this that “man in his simplest form, uncorrupted by education, tends to create his vocabulary in the same way as an infant\(^\text{70}\).” In a like manner, frequently used given names\(^\text{71}\) come to designate types instead of persons. German Rüpel ‘a coarse, rude fellow’ is a pet form of Ruprecht; German Metze ‘whore’, is a pet form of Mechthild; French renard ‘fox’, from German Reinhard\(^\text{72}\). The name of the inventor is often used for the invention: havelock\(^\text{73}\), Tattersall\(^\text{74}\), sandwich, boycott, chauvinism. Local names are internationally applied to local products: sardine, muslin (from the city of Mosul on the Tigris), German Pfirsich ‘peach’ (from persicum, scil. pomum ‘Persian apple’), French tulle (a cloth from the town of Tulle in the Département Corrèze), German Glatzen and English galoshes (from Latin Gallica, scil. solea ‘Gallic sole’), German Talarn and American Dollar (from Joachimsthaler), German Florin (a coin from Florence), German Korinthe ‘raisin’ (from Corintha).

\(^{68}\) With majuscule, an American cigarette; with minuscule, an English piece of clothing, or a piece of furniture.
\(^{69}\) All these nouns Gardiner rightly wishes to exclude from a discussion of proper names, regardless of the accident of spelling, because they no longer fulfill the condition of being χρήτα (on this term see below; p. 30).
\(^{70}\) E. Weekley, Words and Names (London 1932) 84.
\(^{71}\) I am using the term “given name” to denote, in as comprehensive manner as possible, what is variously called “Christian name”, “baptismal name”, “Vornname”, “prénom”, and so on, in other words, that part of the modern Western name which is not inherited legally.
\(^{72}\) See also W. Wackernagel, Kl. Schriften III (Leipzig 1874) 59–177: »Die deutschen Appellativnamen«.
\(^{73}\) In German, an overcoat with a capelike collar extending down to the hips; in English, a covering for a cap; both named after the English general Havelock. Cf. the Eisenhower-(-jacket), fashionable during the Second World War; the Mae West, a life preserver, somewhat bulky about the chest.
\(^{74}\) In German and French, an establishment in which horseback riding is taught and horses are stabled and cared for, also sold and bought; in English, there is only Tattersall’s, a London horse-auction mart. Both are named after Richard Tattersall, a jockey, founder of the London mart.
Sometimes only portions of personal names are woven into compound nouns, which as a result look like proper names. In Notger’s Psalms the Latin dives ‘rich’ is translated by richolf, the second half of which is the name Wolf so common in German compounded names. German Trunkenbold, Dutch dronkaard, English drunkard, are compounds of the verb ‘to drink’ with such commonly occurring second halves of names as -bold and -ard. Similarly, French fuyard ‘runaway’ is composed of the verb fuir ‘to flee’ and -ard. Plautus’ plagipatida ‘thief’ and rapacida ‘robber’ are Latin stems provided with a Greek patronymic suffix to make them evoke names in -δης. Also Latin leguleius, locutuleius, secutuleia, stirteius, ebriacus ‘pettifogger,’ ‘blabbermouth,’ ‘streetwalker (woman),’ ‘snorer,’ ‘drunkard’ are enlargements of stems by means of the gentile suffixes -uleius, -eius, and -acus, in order to produce, for comic effect, the appearance of a gentile name\(^75\). Greek frequently uses the names of gods to signify the elements or objects or activities with which the several gods are habitually associated. Αφελος for war, battle (so often in Homer), Ἡφαιστος for fire, Ἀρροδιτης for love, Δημητης for earth, Βάργος for wine, Ἀμφρίτις for sea, Μοῦρα for song; but Zeus for heaven (cf. Sanskrit dyaus) is rare, since Zeus was not a divinity especially connected with heaven, sky, and since the speakers were no longer conscious of this particular etymology. Similarly in Latin the Greek borrowings Helios, Uranus, Ge, Eos, may stand for sun, heaven, earth, and dawn, respectively\(^76\). What is a proper name in one language may become, by virtue of its connotations, a common noun in another. German Karl, latinized Carolus, becomes in remembrance of Carolus Magnus — Charlemagne, the most eminent bearer of the name — the word for ‘king’ in several languages, e. g., Lithuanian karalius, Russian karóhl, Polish kroi, Hungarian király. Latin Caesar is perpetuated as German Kaiser and Russian tsar ‘emperor’. Thus, also, the common nouns slave and helot originated from ethnic names\(^77\).

\(^{75}\) Cf. Wilh. Schulze, ZGLEN. 283ff.


\(^{77}\) In Horace, Carm. 1. 33 and Epist. 1. 4, occurs a character named Albius who has been identified by some with the elegiac poet Albius Tibullus. This hypothesis was refuted by J. P. Postgate, Selections from Tibullus (London 1903) 179, on the grounds that Glycera, whom Horace mentions as Albius’ lady love, is nowhere mentioned in Tibullus. B. L. Ullman, in AJPh. 33 (1912) 149–167, wants to see in Glycera not a name, but a substitute for a blunt menstrīx ‘whore’. An interesting discussion develops, which can be followed in communications in AJPh. 33 (1912) 451–455 (Postgate), 456–460 (Ullman), C. Quart. 8 (1914) 121–122 (Postgate). For some reason, and to the detriment
Obviously it will not suffice just to say that proper names may cease to be names and become nouns, and that nouns are generally used to make proper names; this explanation merely begs the question. One may go on to find that the name Reinhard gave the French noun renard because in the fables the fox was habitually called Reinhard. (Cf., also, English Reynard the Fox. German Reineke [Fuchs], as in Goethe’s poem, is a diminutive form.) One could be persuaded that the second halves of the compounds Trunkenbold and drunkard, which are names, came to be involved in the formation of nouns because of men with the compounds X+hard and X+bold who were, so to say, the original Trunkenbold and drunkard, just as Quisling was the first quisling. But without documentation one cannot be sure; we know that the very common use of john for toilet can scarcely have anything to do with any one John, but that it is a euphemism (as is toilet[te] itself). It may be quite satisfactory to assume that the sound patterns of some names lent themselves to generic use in the opinion of the originators and of enough imitators to bring them into the domain of the lexicon. No doubt the sound of Quisling, for example, suggests to many, by way of onomatopoeia the sneaky and treacherous — hence the word’s ready acceptance, though its durability has yet to prove itself. But all these interpretations, however interesting historically and culturally, illuminate an exterior semantic development; they explain the how but not the why; they do not explain what inherent quality can make the proper name serve adequately in its new function. “Generalization”, “multiplication”, and the like are good enough descriptive terms, but no more. It is superfluous to embark on a lengthy argument if we may accept a very happy and judicious formula proposed in a book by Felix Solmsen (edited posthumously by Ernst Fraenkel). What makes a proper name a noun is a process in the word which is described as »Erweiterung des Bedeutungsumfanges, Einschränkung des Bedeutungs-inhaltes «, or, “Increase of extensive meaning, decrease of intensive meaning.” To illustrate this, let us take the pair Sandwich and sandwich.

of his argument, Postgate steadfastly refuses to admit that Glyceria could have been used by the poet to mean anything but a woman with this proper name. For numerous examples see J. Reinhard, On Transferred Appellations of Human Beings Chiefly in English and German I (Göteborg 1903) 12 ff.

78 I am reminded of two lines in Christian Morgenstern’s Galgenlieder:
   Die Möwe sehen alle aus
   Als ob sie Emma hießen.

The name *Sandwich* throws a spotlight on the notorious Earl of Sandwich, who, in order not to be obliged to leave the gaming table for meals, regaled himself and his friends, as the story has it, with the first sandwiches. The usefulness and the frequency of occurrence of *sandwich* as compared with *Sandwich* is enormous; the new noun serves to denote, in fact, no less than all the sandwiches in existence since the Earl of Sandwich ate his, and those, too, that will be consumed in the future. Considering this number, and also the great variety of forms in which sandwiches can be served, and the great diversity of ingredients that can be used, the new noun *sandwich* will give but little information as to the composition of an individual sandwich, but it will be very useful to cover comprehensively all the members of a numerous class.

If increase of extensive meaning and decrease of intensive meaning serve so well to describe the mutation of names to nouns, the reverse process, that from nouns to names, should be equally well explained by an inversion of the formula, thus: Decrease of extensive meaning, increase of intensive meaning. Let us assume for the sake of argument that the Earl of Sandwich got his name from the sandwich, because, say, he loved it so well and would eat nothing else. Mutatis mutandis, the argument will stand, namely: «Ein ursprünglicher Gattungsname wird zum Eigennamen, wenn er einem einzelnen Orte oder einer einzelnen Persönlichkeit beigelegt wird. Dabei erleidet die Summe der für den Begriff charakteristischen Merkmale eine Veränderung: die Bezeichnung des Individuums setzt mehr Merkmale voraus als die der Gattung, und auf diese Weise findet eine Isolierung des Eigennamens gegenüber dem Gattungsnamen auch dann statt, wenn für das Sprachgefühl die eigentliche Identität beider noch vollkommen klar sein sollte: diese Isolierung bewirkt auch vielfach, daß Gattungsnamen und ursprünglich damit identische Eigennamen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung und Umgestaltung verschiedene Wege eingeschlagen und dadurch der einstmalige Zusammenhang unkenntlich wird.»

In the second chapter it was pointed out, through a philosophical rather than strictly linguistic deduction, that the act of naming must have been among the most ancient speech performances. In Chapter III an attempt was made to show how all proper names, regardless of their historical form, are to be derived from common nouns. From all this, the original and continued oneness of what we now call "noun" and "name" should become apparent, and it should also become clear how the disparity that is commonly felt to exist between them is one pro-

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80 Solmsen-Fraenkel, l. c. 8.

81 Ibid. 2.
duced by usage and performance. The ease with which noun and name are functionally interchangeable without passing; one should note, into another grammatical category will bring no little weight to bear in favor of the proposed theory.

The objection that in a great many proper names, perhaps in the majority, no common noun can be discerned, does not perturb us; in fact, when we consider the phonological vagaries that occur in proper names, we may readily adduce many reasons, and very plausible ones, to explain why a name changes its acoustic pattern in such a way that its root becomes unrecognizable, or why the phonetic changes it undergoes should be fewer and not the same as those otherwise characteristic of the period and the locality. In the main there are two profound causes: (1) the basic word itself becomes altogether incomprehensible to speakers of later days, it is no longer part of the current vocabulary; (2) while a common noun corresponding to the proper name still exists, it has, through regular sound change, attained an aural appearance which diverges enough from that of the name to make etymological identification of the two difficult or impossible. Names are as a rule more conservative, because once a proper name has become attached to an individual entity, especially to a person or to a whole family, a change would run counter to the aim of its function, which is unambiguous identification. To avoid, or at least to reduce the chances of, variability is its very raison d'être.

V. Name and noun

The commonest and most obvious criterion by which people believe they can recognize a proper name is its function of designating individuals, certain unique human or other single entities. However, common nouns can serve the same purpose in special connections, provided always that they are structured grammatically like names and not like nouns in a given language, for example, without the article in English. Thus to say “Mary has gone away” and “Sister has gone away,” may be exactly equivalent in the significance intended by a speaker whose sister’s name is Mary, and it will be so understood by the listener acquainted with

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82 Cf. V. Hugo, Les Misérables (Paris 1930) I. 226: «La petite se nommait Euphrasie. Mais d'Euphrasie la mère avait fait Cosette, par ce doux et généreux instinct des mères et du peuple. ... C'est là un genre de dérivés qui dérange et déconcerte toute la science des étymologistes.»

83 See Solmsen-Fraenkel I. c. 8ff., where examples are given.
this relationship. Similarly, the answer “I” elicited by the question “Who is it?” addressed to someone who knocks on my door, may for all practical purposes take the place of a name, if I recognize the voice of the person outside. If I do not, the person’s giving me a full name may not improve the situation in case I have never met him. After this double failure of identification, the only consideration which prompts me to receive the caller is politeness or an interest in the reason for his visit. Indeed, had he answered, “The grocer’s boy,” instead of “I” or “John Jones” in the first place, the whole matter of his admission to my house would have run more smoothly. In other words, his voice and his name being unknown to me, it was really not a personal identification but a statement of his business which satisfied me. It was of greater importance to know what he was than who he was. Of course, had I been expecting a John Jones, I should also have known why he came, or at least anticipated his arrival. And if I had let in an unknown visitor without questioning, on the strength of his knock alone, I should have asked immediately who he was and why he had come. Thereafter I might or might not have retained his name, depending on his importance, on the interest his business was capable of arousing in me. I could not afford to be interested in anyone’s name merely for the sake of knowing it, since too many names could thus make claims upon my memory. It will be well to keep this concept of interest in mind for further discussion. Sister, I, the grocer’s boy may, then, in a particular context perform the same semantic service as a personal name, and sometimes they may be even more adequate.

Adolf Noreen mentions certain words which, within a certain group of persons, have particular predominant meanings whereby they are actually proper names in function, whereas they may be ordinary nouns in other persons’ speech. Nouns like Tiergarten, Graben, Oper have a fixed dictionary meaning, but in addition they convey to an inhabitant of Berlin or Vienna the picture of a definite locality in the city. Danish hest means ‘horse,’ but in Copenhagen it may refer to the equestrian statue of King Christian V. Speaking of “the Monument” in London, one often means a particular monument commemorating the Great Fire of 1666. (A tube station is called “Monument.”) In Paris, “le Bois” is

84 See Hermann Paul, I. c., especially Chapter 4, „Wandel der Wortbedeutung, 74 ff. There the distinction between the okkasionalle and usuell meaning of nouns is described. It is generally the usage in the okkasionalle Bedeutung which converts a common noun into a proper name.

85 A. Noreen, Einführung in die wissenschaftliche Betrachtung der Sprache (Halle a. S. 1923) 380. See also Paul, I. c. 74 ff.
the Bois de Boulogne (and scarcely ever the Bois de Vincennes), "l'Eau" is the Seine, and "Faubourg" without specification is usually the Faubourg Saint-Germain. French patriots with a royalist tinge always mean Louis XIV and Napoleon I if they speak of "le Roi" and "l'Empereur". A family frequently has a special name, more often than not unflattering, for a neighbor; the members of a family may have special nicknames, known and used within the family only. Even objects may acquire human proper names, so that sometimes a form of code may establish itself within small groups to the bewilderment of strangers, who feel excluded from this circle — and such exclusion may well be the result desired. In English usage the utterance "to go to town" indicates in every instance a well-defined locale with a proper name of its own, and always refers to the nearest town. Consequently, the definition of proper name merely as a noun peculiarly attached to a unique object is too wide.

Often phonetic structure affords the opportunity of reducing a word to its root, that irreducible fragment which contains the kernel of meaning. But etymologizing the word name in all its Indo-European forms, cognates, and equivalents has so far remained fruitless. No theory can satisfactorily account for such divergent forms as Sanskrit nāman, Old Persian nāman, Greek ἴσωνυ, Latin nōmen, Tocharish A nam, Tocharish B nem, Old Irish ainm, Gothic namo, Old Prussian emmens, Old Church Slavonic ime, Albanian êmën. (Another series, from a root *wer- 'to speak' [cf. Greek future ἐρώ] plus -dh-, comprises Lithuanian vardas, Old Prussian wīrd, Gothic waurd, Latin verbam, English word, German Wort.) Johannes Schmidt suggests no fewer than four different roots to accommodate all Indo-European forms — an unlikely hypothesis.

A more recent treatise on Indo-European roots suggests that what often looks like a simple root may originally have been a compound of

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86 Cf. K. Nyrop, Das Leben der Wörter, German translation by Robert Vogt (Leipzig 1923) 85.

87 In the United States the idiom "to go to town" has acquired the meaning of doing something thoroughly, successfully, and with great relish. The origin of the expression is obvious: the town is, especially for rusties, the center of distraction and amusement, of opportunities for adventure and business.

two roots, of which one appears in the vanishing grade\(^{88}\). This theory, if applied to the problem of nōmen and nāma, side by side with \(^{90}\)gnomen, cognomen, leads van Langenhove to assume that one has to start from two roots in the following arrangement:

1. \(\delta^{*}en\, \text{‘to designate’} + \varepsilon^{*} \rightarrow nō\, (+\text{the formant -men});\)
2. \(\varepsilon^{*}o\) (cf. \(\varepsilon n\, \text{‘to be born’});\) vanishing grade \(\delta^{*}o^{*} + \varepsilon^{*}e n^{*} + \varepsilon^{*}o \rightarrow gnō\, (+\text{the formant -men}).\)

From (1) we might derive nomen, nama, \(\delta νομα\) (with \(o\) from laryngeal); from (2), the compounded root, are derived \(^{*}g\nu\nu\nu\nu, g\nu\nu\nuo\nu, c\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu.\) This latter series contains gn-, as does signo, γνωμα, from a root meaning ‘to be born’, as well as no-, from a root meaning ‘to designate’. Semantically, ‘to be begotten’ actually coincides with ‘to be’, whereas ‘to be’ is, as it were, ‘to be known to be’, that is, ‘to be known’ by designation, by name. Therefore, when we ask the question whether there is any linguistic evidence to indicate what part of a man his name is, our answer, in the spirit of van Langenhove’s theory, would be that it is something he has because he has been born, by which his existence is known, and which serves to identify him. This happens to fit the great majority of proper names\(^{89}\).

Another etymology connects \(\delta νομα\) with \(\delta νομα\, \text{‘I blame, censure, revile’}\) and is based on the primitive custom of keeping one’s name secret for protection, because knowledge of the name confers power over its bearer, which is particularly dangerous if evil demons are involved. Therefore, in order to deceive inimical persons and spirits, one uses nicknames instead of ‘real’ names. Since nicknames often tend to be derogatory rather than flattering, partly for purposes of depreciation in order to impress malevolent spirits with the unimportance of the person involved, the connection of \(\delta νομα\) in the meaning ‘nickname’ and, later, ‘name’


\(^{90}\) But cf. Hans Hendrickxsen, Untersuchungen über die Bedeutung des Hethitischen für die Laryngaltheorie. Det Kgl. Danske Videnskab. Selskab. Hist.-filol. Meddelelser 82, 2 (København 1941). The Hittite word for ‘name’ is la-a-ma-an, in which \(l\) is explained by dissimulation (cf. gen. sg. lam-na-ťaš < *nammaš) and in which no initial laryngeal is wrongly supposed for the cognate Greek δομα and the Latin nōmen, must be assumed. Hence the root \(^{*}gno\, \text{‘to know’}, which Hendrickxsen sees in γνώσω, Sanskrit jānatī ‘he knows’, and Hittite ḫa-an-na-i ‘to judge’ (where the ḫa < ḫa < ke), cannot be connected with nōmen, δομα, nāma, because the last three have no trace of a laryngeal, as proved by the Hittite form la-a-ma-an. Besides, there is no explanation for the ḫ in nōmen and nāma. (See Hendrickxsen, pp. 50,51; also pp. 25–26, 45, 48.)
with ἵπποι can be understood. In this manner a name is, genetically speaking, a nickname.  
Apart from these attempts, which one may or may not consider fruitful, the phonetic appearance of the words for name yields no result to enlighten us on its semantic content. The next best procedure for arriving at a definition may be to examine the manner and context in which the word name and its equivalents in the various tongues were used, and how there arose, in modern European languages in particular, such phrases and compounds as proper name, nom propre, Eigennname.

It is surely significant that not only grammarians, but also philosophers, psychologists, logicians, felt compelled to discuss the problem. Among the ancients these learned callings were frequently incorporated in one person. By this token, the judgment of such persons may be either illuminating, or quite worthless. Their pronouncements must therefore not be surrounded with a halo of unfounded reverence for their antiquity, as was the practice of many of their medieval, and also later, admirers. Of this particular subject they knew no more than we do, perhaps less, and we cannot attribute to them, like to ancient historians, an immediacy to the facts which is no longer ours. If I nonetheless offer, ancient testimony, it is because a great deal of current confusion is rooted in misinterpretation and mistranslation of ancient terminology.

One more word of caution is in order here, with regard to both ancient and modern authors. Arguments are often advanced that seem plausible enough, but that are restricted to the writer's own linguistic usage, and do not hold beyond one speech area. For example, the absence of the article has been called a distinguishing feature of proper names. This may be largely true for English, and also for literary German. But in spoken German the article is quite common, indeed prevalent: die Marie, der Franz, der Schulze. If the noun is modified, the article is required also in literary German: der junge Goethe. In French, Madame Durand is often referred to as la Durand. (Note that French does not modify names in gender and number: never la Durande, or les Durands. In German this may be done: die Schulzin [fem.], die Schulzen [plur.].) In Italian one is required to say il Dante, lo Shakespeare, la Galli-Curci.

91 Cf. F. Specht, Die äußere Sprachform als Ausdruck der seelischen Einstellung. Die älteren Sprachen 5 (1940) 112–122, especially p. 121. It is of course possible to propose the reverse derivation, namely, ἵπποι from ἵππα: cf. English "to call someone names", viz. bad names, to revile him.

92 Cf. C. D. Buck, A Dictionary of Selected Synonyms in the Principal Indo-European Languages (Chicago 1949) 1284: "Nearly all the common words for 'name' belong to an inherited group of unknown root connection."
In English the article is used correctly with the plural of names: the Johns, the Smiths. It is always the United States, the Alps, the Pyrenees; indeed, there is no United State, no Pyrenees, no Alp. However, we are concerned here not with the question of proper name in languages but in language. Since a great proportion of the grammatical terms now commonly in use are based on Dionysius Thrax’s Τέχνη Γραμματική of the first century B.C., his remarks may be a not unsuitable point of departure:

"Ονόμα ἐστι μέρος λόγου πτωτικόν, σώμα ἡ πράγμα σημαίνον, σώμα μὲν οὖν λόγος, πράγμα δὲ οὖν παθεῖσα, κοινῶς τε καὶ ἑαυτῶς λεγόμενον, κοινῶς μὲν οὖν ἐνθρόως ἐπιστ. ἑαυτῶς δὲ οὖν Σωκράτης... 94.

Κύριον μὲν οὖν ἐστι τὸ τὴν ἱδέαν ὀνόμαν σημαίνον, οἷον "Ομήρου Σωκράτης, προσηγορικὸν δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ τὴν κοινὴν ωσί τοι σημαίνον, οἷον ἐνθρόως ἐπιστ. 95.

The term ὄνομα κύριον was translated into Latin as nomen proprium, whence nom propre, nome proprio, proper noun (name), and so on. It was further translated literally into German Eigennname and Russian, innya sobstvennoye and by this process no doubt further diluted and semantically distorted. For it would have been more accurate to render Greek ὄνομα κύριον by ‘genuine name’, or ‘name properly so’, just as Latin proprium means not only ‘proper, own, belonging to’, but also ‘peculiar, characteristic, properly so’, in opposition to ‘common, ordinary’. If, therefore, ὄνομα κύριον and nomen proprium, that is, ‘name par excellence’, ‘name κατ’ εξαρχήν’ (which equals Hermann Paul’s “okkasionell”)96, had been translated not by ‘proper noun (name)’, but by ‘genuine name’, ‘name properly so’, as distinguished from, and opposed to, an ordinary appellative, a general name, a common noun, for which the technical term προσηγορία (προσηγορία), was used, great confusion in terminology would have been prevented.

The quotation from Dionysius Thrax shows quite clearly that κύριον was used as an explanatory defining attribute of the term ὄνομα, exactly the differentia specifica we have been seeking. The traditional translations, understood in the traditional manner, are therefore the results

93 The word Alp, German Alm, Alp(e), exists not as a name, but as a common noun.

94 Τέχνη Γραμματική, ed. Uhlig (Leipzig 1883), §12, p. 24: “A name is a type of word capable of inflection, signifying a concretum or an abstractum: a concretum like stone, an abstractum like education; in a general or a specific meaning: in a general meaning like man, horse, in a specific meaning like Socrates.”

95 Ibid. §12, pp. 33–34: “A proper name, then, is one signifying a specific reality, like Homer, Socrates. A common name is one signifying a general reality, like man, horse.”

96 See above, n. 84.
of an error 47. Dionysius Thrax is not in the least ambiguous as to what he means by ὄνομα, viz: (1) σῶμα οὗν λόθος ‘a concretum like stone'; (2) πράγμα οὗν παιδέα ‘an abstractum like education'. In each of these two usages the term may be employed (a) κοινῶς λεγόμενον οὗν ἀνθρώπος ἔπος ‘in a general meaning like man, horse', or (b) ἰδίως λεγόμενον οὗν Σωκράτης ‘in a specific meaning like Socrates.' The last variety is called ὄνομα χώρων ‘a name properly so' because it is ἰδίων ὀσίων σημαίνον ‘signifying an individual reality.' Προστιγμόρεις ‘common noun' (cf. ἀπορείω ‘I speak') is then simply ὄνομα οὗ χώρων ‘a name not properly so', not a genuine name. That ὄνομα was used by itself without attribute in the sense of ‘proper name' in opposition to προστιγμόρεις needs no special proof; the dictionary records it in such usage, beside its grammatical meaning 'noun'. If an explicit statement from a grammarian is needed, here is Zeno (the Stoic):

"Εστὶ δὲ προστιγμόρια μὲν κατὰ τὸν Διογένη χέρας λόγον σημαίνον κοινῶν ποιήται, οὗν ἄνθρωπος ἔπος. ὄνομα δὲ ἐστὶ μέρος λόγου δηλοῦν ἰδίαν ποιήται, οὗν Διογένης Σωκράτης.“ 48

In Latin, besides meaning 'noun', nomen (like ὄνομα) was adequate to denote nomen proprium. “Appellandi partes sunt quattuor, e quis dicta a quibusdam provocabula quae sunt ut quis quae; vocabula ut scutum gladium; nomina ut Romulus Remus; pronomina ut hic haec.” 49 The word for noun, then, was vocabulary, that for name, nomen — though not exclusively. All this is evidence that to ancient authorities the difference between proper name and common noun was one of degree rather than of kind.

How has the problem been treated by modern authors? John Stuart Mill, upon whose discussion most later studies are based, insists forcefully that "the distinction between general names and individual or singular names is fundamental . . . ." 50 That much has become evident in the course of our examination, also. But I wish to modify his statement,

47 Cf. G. F. Schoemann, Die Lehre von den Redeteilen (Berlin 1862) 82 n. 2; J. Wackernagel, l. c. 61.
48 Zeno ap. Diog. Laert. 7. 58: “A common noun is, according to Diogenes, a type of word signifying a general entity, like man, horse; but a proper name is a type of word indicating a specific entity, like Diogenes, Socrates.”
49 Varro, Lingua Latina 8. 45: “There are four nominal parts of speech, of which words like who, what, are called pre-[common] nouns by some; words like shield, sword, are called common nouns; words like Romulus, Remus, are called (proper) nouns; and words like this, that, are called pre-[proper] nouns.” Note that it is vocabulary ‘noun' which contains the root voc- ‘to call, to name'.
50 J. St. Mill, System of Logic (London 1843) I 2. § 3. See also A. H. Gardiner, c. l. Chapter 1 and passim.
adding that, although the distinction appears fundamental, it has become so through a certain development, and rests now on the current value of the respective terms, and not on a twofold origin\textsuperscript{101}. Mill then proceeds to define the two kinds of names, (proper) names and (common) names or nouns as one has to come to call them: "A general name is, familiarly defined, a name which is capable of being truly affirmed, in the same sense, of each of an indefinite number of things. An individual or singular name is a name which is only capable of being truly affirmed, in the same sense, of one thing. Thus man is capable of being truly affirmed of John, Peter, George, and other persons without assignable limits: and it is affirmed of all of them in the same sense; for the word man expresses certain qualities, and when we predicate it of those persons, we assert that they all possess these qualities. But John is only capable of being truly affirmed of one single person, at least in the same sense"\textsuperscript{1102}.

Instead of his being described in all the minute details that constitute his distinctive personality (a process which is potentially endless), a particular man is provided with a personal name which, consequently, fulfills no more and no less than the function of a label, a mark, a condensed formula, a number, for a great many particularities conglomerated in a very complex manner, in one specimen. It is quite feasible, though not always practical, that people be identified and called by numbers, as indeed they are when they join a body in which their individuality becomes, perforce or perchance, diminished in importance and of less interest, as, for example, in prison, in military units, or on the time clock of a workshop.

I have just written the words "individuality," "importance," and "interest." Loss of name and its replacement by a number are felt, by most people, as a deplorable, often dishonorable, but sometimes necessary, loss of individuality\textsuperscript{103}. If a man is not important enough to own a name, if nobody is interested in knowing his name, he feels that he has entered, in his living days, upon the path to oblivion\textsuperscript{104}. A psycho-

\textsuperscript{101} Cf. also O. Funke, Zur Definition des Begriffes 'Eigenname'. Festschr. f. Johannes Hoops (Heidelberg 1925) 72–79.

\textsuperscript{1102} Mill, l. c. 12, § 3.

\textsuperscript{103} In the United States, the State of Montana has decreed that, from 1 January 1949 on, every inhabitant of the state should upon birth receive a number, which should accompany and identify him until he died. But so far nothing has been said about the name being abolished and replaced by this number.

\textsuperscript{104} P. Rosegger (see above, p. 15f.) describes in his Schriften des Waldschulmeisters (14th ed. Wien 1894) 142–143, the reaction of a social outcast to an attempt to give him a suitable legal name: "'Einen Namen, schreit er, für mich? Ich brauch' keinen Namen, ich bin ja Niemand. Zu einem Weib hat mich Gott nicht gemacht, und ein Mann sein,
logical factor of considerable magnitude enters into the process of name-giving and the fact of name-bearing. Perhaps it is a manifestation of this same psychological force which converts a common noun into a proper name simply by intensification (not extension) of content and interest, an increase of importance, a process of individualization. "Die Welt, in der wir leben, bietet Dinge, die uns erstens aus irgendwelchen Gründen als Individuen interessieren, und bei denen wir uns zweitens zutrauen, sie individuell jederzeit abzuheben von anderen und wiederzuerkennen. Solchen Dingen geben wir Eigennamen". Again the idea of interest.

Unfortunately, neither the concept of interest nor that of importance enters into John Stuart Mill's argument. But they are implicit in the notions of connotation and denotation which for Mill constitute essential criteria in fixing the concept of proper name. "All concrete general names are connotative. The word man, for example, denotes Peter, Paul, John, and an indefinite number of other individuals, of whom, taken as a class, it is the name. But it is applied to them, because they possess, and to signify that they possess, certain attributes .... For example, if in the interior of Africa there were to be discovered a race of animals possessing human reason equal to that of human beings, but with the form of an elephant, they would not be called men. Swift's Houyhnhnms were not so called". From this Mill deduces that "the attribute, or attributes, may therefore be said to denominate these objects, or give them a common name ....". The proper name, however, has nothing whatever to do with the named object's attributes, he thinks; it no longer contains any connotation. "It has been seen that all concrete general names are connotative .... Proper names are not connotative; they denote the individuals who are called by them; but they do not indicate or imply attributes as belonging to those individuals."

The conclusion at which Mill arrives, then, is that proper names remain with the object to which they have been attached, once and for all, regardless of the mutation in time, place, and appearance which the object undergoes. "Proper names are not dependent upon the conti-
nuance of any attribute of the object." To identify, therefore, an object unambiguously and unmistakably as belonging to a certain class whose members are all recognizable by certain attributes, one needs to know and to call it by a connotative name, that is, a common noun. "Whenever the names given to objects convey any information, that is, whenever they have properly any meaning, the meaning resides not in what they denote, but in what they connote. The only names of objects which connote nothing are proper names, and these have, strictly speaking, no meaning." Hence a proper name, according to Mill, contains no indication of what the object is like, except in a very general, superficial fashion. It becomes simply a label for future reference. "When we impose a proper name, we perform an operation in some degree analogous to what the robber intended on chalking the house. We put a mark, not indeed upon the object itself, but if I may so speak, upon the idea of the object. A proper name is but an unmeaning mark which we connect in our minds with the idea of the object, in order that whenever the mark meets our eyes or occurs to our thoughts, we may think of the individual object. Pace Mill, that does not seem logical. An unmeaning mark cannot make anyone think of anything. For if a mark does make one think of something, in particular the object for which it stands, then it is very meaningful indeed. Every word is such a mark; it represents something. This is the basic axiom of any theory of language. Letters are meaningless signs to an illiterate person. "H₂SO₄" may be quite senseless even to the literate person who knows nothing about chemistry; if sulphuric acid be written out, it will be understood by some who know what sulphuric is and what acid is and what sulphuric acid is; otherwise it will still remain meaningless, although articulated speech and legible writing. Yet sulphuric acid is not a proper name. Socrates is, and it should be, therefore, according to Mill, a meaningless label. Is it really? Does it not rather mean a great many things, which, for convenience, are contracted into the formula of this particular proper name? Naturally, to some persons Socrates will be as empty a noise as sulphuric

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109 Ibid. See below, n. 112.
110 Ibid.
111 Mill refers here to a story in A Thousand and One Nights. The robber's ruse was thwarted when, upon returning to plunder the house bearing the chalk mark, he found other houses with the identical sign. Thereby identification of the one object in which he was interested (N. B. I) became impossible.
112 This contradicts, at least in terms, if not also in spirit, Mill's statement quoted above, at n. 109.
113 Mill, l. c. I 2, § 5.
acid would be to an African pygmy. Others will associate with it a more or less vague idea of antiquity, Greece, philosophy, hemlock. And what must it not have meant to Plato, Voltaire, Jowett!

Mill offers his own example of the meaningless label: “... by saying: This is York, we may tell [the listener] that it contains the Minster. But this by virtue of what he has previously heard concerning York, not by anything implied in the name”114. True, but where else is this information contained implicitly, if not in the name, considering that the name is all that has been uttered by the speaker? While York and Minster are not by any means conterminous, the word York by itself is capable of evoking the association Minster. The listener had to possess the knowledge of the Minster’s location at York, to be sure. But is not factual knowledge necessary for the comprehension of the meaning of nouns as well as of names? What does orchid mean to an Eskimo, what glacier to a Papuan, what aurora borealis to a Mexican Indian (and I am waiving considerations of linguistic incomprehension), unless he has acquired a factual, though not necessarily contaactual, knowledge of the meaning of these words? These examples are not names, but common nouns, yet they are, in the circumstances indicated, just as devoid of meaning as the term York is to a person ignorant of the existence of this locality. Therefore, meaninglessness cannot be ascribed to names as a characteristic. Any common noun can be as meaningless and as empty of connotations as an unknown proper name.

Let us consider the example York from another angle. Suppose it to be utterly strange to a listener who hears it without a context: “York”. Then it is indeed meaningless, a porcine grunt. But it is far more likely that the word will be heard in context, thus: “I spent the weekend with a friend at York”. (The context may also be extra-linguistic, like the train conductor’s shout, upon arrival at a station, “York”). Regardless of the exact geographical location, this makes it at least clear that York is a locale. Or looking at a map, one can read, printed in the type reserved for cities of a certain size on this particular map, the name York. This will leave no doubt that York is a city. Or a timetable may read: “York, arr. 10:45, dep. 10:55”, and that even supplies a clue as to the size and importance of the town. Let us therefore add “context” to importance, interest, and individuality, as a fourth factor to reckon with in defining the proper name. The meaning of York becomes clear and significant through the context in which it stands, through the importance the name acquires on a certain occasion, (say, if one has to change trains at York) and through the interest attached to it individually

114 Ibid.
(if one is a tourist interested in cathedrals). But the difference between not knowing what York is and not knowing what an orchid, a glacier, or the aurora borealis is, is to be sought in the degree of ignorance, and lies not in the class of words to which each belongs. York is a convenient formula for a very complex system of cerebral engrams; it can be interpreted from many viewpoints: as a site of a cathedral, by the pious or the architect; as the home of the House of York, by the historian; as the home of Mary Smith, by James Brown; as a market, by the traveling salesman; as a system of streets and buildings, by the city planner. And to know one thing about York does not necessitate or imply a knowledge of several or all of its more or less memorable aspects.

Consider the word apple. By affirming that one knows what an apple is, one asserts the certainty of recognizing any undisguised apple, anywhere, of being able to distinguish it from a pear, and of calling it correctly in a given language. Yet the horticulturist, the botanist, the orchard owner, the grocer, will tell you that you really know next to nothing about apples, if the word apple is the only one you use to identify promiscuously a great variety of types. In fact, in the expert's language the word apple hardly occurs, unless he 'talks down' to an ignorant layman. He knows Pippins, Codlins, Reinettes, Baldwins, McIntosh Reds, Biffins, Rome Beauties: asking him for 'apples' would seem as silly as asking a florist for 'flowers'\textsuperscript{115}. Each kind of apple the expert associates with a certain color, size, taste, provenance, use, and value.

Are these various apple names, then, proper names? They seem to be, since they are spelled with capital letters, which, in English, apart from appearing at the beginning of a sentence, are reserved for proper names\textsuperscript{116}. But are they truly proper names to the expert? Are they not, to him, common nouns with which the not-interested person is not familiar, just as violet, rose, and dandelion are common nouns to almost everyone? Few people set out to buy an "automobile". They buy a Ford, a Chevrolet, a Rolls Royce, a Mercedes, a Renault, a Fiat. And even fewer people go to a pet shop to buy a "dog". They want a setter, a dachshund, a Doberman, a Pekinese\textsuperscript{117} — just a "dog" need not be bought for dear money. The names of canine breeds have been known for centuries, the names of makes of automobiles only for a few years, at least to people

\textsuperscript{115} And if one ever mentioned balsam apples, egg apples, custard apples, or apples of Sodom to a botanist, he would point out that these are not really "apples".


\textsuperscript{117} Also spellings with minuscule, doberman, pekinese, can be found. The usage does not seem fixed. But see below, n. 118.
in a position to bother acquainting themselves with them; and the names of various types of apples should, and could, have become generally known as each kind appeared on the market, since practically everyone eats apples. But comparatively few care what kind they eat to the extent of retaining the names. Notice the prevalent spelling practice in English today: names of apples with majuscules — they are strictly proper names to the great majority of speakers; names of automobiles with majuscules — they, also, are proper names, associated with the name of the producer or the factory, they are trade-marks; but the names of breeds of dogs are mostly spelled with minuscules\footnote{But as a rule one writes with capitals Pekinese, Dobermanpinscher, Great Pyrenees, Rottweiler, Samoyede, Airedale terrier, St. Bernard, Maltese, Welsh terrier, Chihuahua, Pomeranian, Dalmatian, Norwich terrier, Affenpinscher. It must be noted that all these are names from names, particularly from place names, or foreign (German) borrowed names. Generally terrier is spelled with a minuscule; Airedale, Welsh, and so on, are spelled with a majuscule. Besides terrier, all the names of common breeds are spelled with minuscule (at least in the Encyclopaedia Britannica; individual usage and dictionaries may vary): setter, spaniel, pointer, bengle, dachshund (though a German borrowing), borzoi, greyhound, mastiff, boxer, bulldog, collie, schnauzer, shepherd, chowchow, puddle, and many others. Nonetheless, some may insist that a certain dog is not a collie, but a Collie. But that only proves my point: it is an easy transition from name to noun, and vice versa, and, as relates to dogs, at any rate, adhuc sub indice lis est.} — because they have, in general usage, long ago ceased to be proper names and have become, through their importance to humans, familiar general nouns\footnote{In modern English the spelling actually is indicative of the usage of a word. This distinction is not universal; it does not appear in German, for example, where both nouns and names are always capitalized (apart from some reformed spelling systems, all unsuccessful so far).}.

The designations of the various brands of apples are obviously proper names to the average layman. And if the consumer does not know wherein the excellence of a Pippin\footnote{There is a spelling pippin, also. The Encyclopaedia Britannica, however, lists all brands of apples with majuscules.} lies, he will not ask for it, but will simply buy “apples”, or at best be guided by appearance and taste. How much meaning the name Pippin holds depends entirely on the hearer. In most cases it will be little enough, and to some persons it will refer, out of context, to Charlemagne’s ancestors rather than to a fruit. To the small number of apple experts all these special terms may, but probably will not, seem proper names, just as to most people collie and lily (as distinguished from Lily) are common nouns. If one wanted to deduce from this that there are more connoisseurs, real or fancied, of dogs and flowers than of apples, one would not be far wrong. No doubt the apple grower’s interest in apples will be rather profound, and
in his mind Pippins, Codlins, Reinettes, will tend to become, as it were, pippins, codlins, reinettes. (But it will be difficult to spell, on paper or mentally, beauties of Kent, northern spies, delicious, instead of Beauties of Kent, Northern Spies, Delicious, since the words are part of the current English vocabulary and are employed only metaphorically for apples.) Both proper and common nouns may be either meaningful or meaningless (if meaning is defined as linguistic exchange value), the alternative not being conditioned by any quality inherent in either class, but by the degree of ignorance or knowledge inherent in the hearer or reader. That is true of Socrates and John Jones, of Codlin and dachshund, of tree and snow.

It lies in the nature of things that to each individual a great many more existing proper names than common nouns remain unknown, regardless of the meagerness of his vocabulary. This is so because proper names are attached to smaller, hence relatively more numerous, entities, mostly to unique specimens; because it would be an impossible feat to remember all, or even a goodly share, of the proper names of the past and present the world over; and because, last but not least, to the individual the vast majority of proper names in existence are neither interesting nor important enough to be committed to memory. It is quite unnecessary to know and remember the name of every person on whom one lays eyes in the course of a lifetime, or of whom one hears, or who lives in one’s town or on one’s street — and besides, it is impossible. If such knowledge were desirable, the memorizing of telephone directories could be judged a commendable enterprise.

Our desire to know names will therefore be determined by our predilections, interests, and necessities. As a fastidious eater of apples likes and buys, let us say, Reinettes only, so someone likes and fancies certain persons only, or is obliged to associate with certain persons. There is a multitude of criteria which determine a person’s discrimination, but whatever the basis of one’s selection, selection is practiced, either by preference or through necessity or through both. One will have to become acquainted, willy nilly, with the proper names of a greater or smaller number of persons (and animals, and inanimate objects) according to one’s business, inclination, or obligation. One also has to gather a considerable stock of proper names of persons dead long since, simply for the sake of historical knowledge. In fact, as regards the burden imposed on one’s memory, it matters not at all whether the bearers of some names are in this or the other world. On meeting a person, or a name, one decides, or is forced, to retain the name in one’s memory. Henceforth the bearer of this name is no longer an anonymous member of a class,
of a herd, but is designated individually by a mark, a label, by which we recognize him or her or it, and the visual or auditory sensation of this label will produce associations in a trickle or in a gushing stream, according to our knowledge of the object. As a rule, the label by which we learn to identify these objects will have been delivered to us ready-made by the accident of previous naming.

Without a minimum knowledge of nouns as they are contained in a dictionary, linguistic intercourse is impossible; but a complete ignorance of names as they are contained in an encyclopedia, a telephone directory, the Who's Who, even ignorance of the names of persons with whom a man lives, would in no wise prevent him from talking intelligibly, if not intelligently. In other words, a man not knowing who Galilei was is still able to refer to the stars in the sky; not knowing the name of his employer a man is still able to ask for a plough to till his employer's fields; and not knowing the name of Einstein, a man may be able, some day, to go into a store to ask for an atomic battery. Every speaker knows relatively more knowable nouns than he knows knowable names.

If epistemological difficulties which do not concern the average speaker in everyday life are excluded, there will be little cause for argument about, and misunderstanding of, such ordinary nouns as table, horse, house, street, and thousands of others. They all represent easily identifiable classes which contain an immense number of specimens that are all unlike one another, but that are sufficiently alike for inclusion under a class name. But there is no class, no species, of John Joneses, at least not in the same sense as there is a species of horses. If A mentions to B the word horse, they will both know what they are considering (provided both know English). But if A mentions to B the name John Jones, the situation is more complex, for it is quite possible that they both know one John Jones, but not the same John Jones. Or perhaps B

121 Though philosophers may worry about das Ding an sich, practically a speaker takes no cognizance of the problem if he wishes to maintain linguistic communication. And if he philosophically has qualms about just what a horse is, he must linguistically act as if he and everyone else did indeed know what it was. (Vaihinger's philosophy of the aAls ob es comes to mind here.) Does not, in fact, the epistemologist himself, as long as he uses human language, conveniently and inevitably assume that he and his hearers do know the meaning of his words—except perhaps the one he has proposed as the example of his epistemological preoccupation?

122 Proper and acceptable classifying is more difficult with such disputed terms as art, socialism, god, justice, democracy, loyalty, and many others. That the meaning of such terms is so much at variance in the minds of their users is not the least cause for the numerous quarrels fought over them—although I do not mean to say that all our troubles are verbal, semantic. (Cf. Barrows Dunham, Man against Myth [Boston 1947] Chapter IX, pp. 233–266.)
knows two or more John Joneses and has to inquire which one is referred to by A. In an extreme case, if B is acquainted with a hundred or more John Joneses, his position will be very difficult, because the name by itself has, to him at least, become practically meaningless for the specific reference intended — not because he does not connect some meaning with it, but because he associates too many meanings with a term that was not created for this task of generic appellation. What attribute or attributes, to use Mill’s terminology, are there in the hundred John Joneses which denominate these objects, give them a common name? To say that a name in common gives them a common name is a tautology or, if one took common name to stand for noun, it would be a falsehood, because John Jones does not denote a class, and it never can do so merely on account of its applicability to a hundred relatively insignificant John Joneses. It is not the lack of meaning in John Jones that is responsible for B’s confusion, but, rather, the absence of understanding on B’s part, or, quite possibly, the consciously or unconsciously ambiguous use of a certain term by A. The same confusion would arise if A in saying horse referred not to a class but to a certain horse, his horse, the horse he bet on. In that case he would be using a common noun without further attribute, when he should be using a name, or at least should be more explicit that he was speaking of one specimen and not of a class.

The most obvious rejoinder to Mill’s theory of the meaninglessness of names would be this: If proper names are meaningless, why and how do they exist? Gardiner remarks rightly: “If ‘meaning’ be taken to signify simply ‘exchange value’, then obviously all proper names have meaning, since they are words and every word is a sound-sign standing for something being its exchange value.”123 Otto Jespersen even goes so far as to say that proper names are the most meaningful of all nouns and that “Mill and his followers124 lay too much stress on what might he called the dictionary-value of the name, and too little on contextual value in the particular situation in which it is spoken or written”125. Felicitous, I think, is this phrasing (occurring in an otherwise not very profound book): “It is more or less an accident that some of these [words], having become proper names, are excluded from the dictionaries. Others still discharge a double function and are equally the prey of the lexicographer and the name hunter”126.

123 Gardiner, l. c. 32.
124 Among them one should cite H. Bertelsen, Fællessnavne og egennavne (København 1911).
125 O. Jespersen, l. c. 64.
126 E. Weekley, Surnames (London 1916) 23. Concerning the opinion that names qua names are, as Mill says, “strictly speaking” meaningless, an interesting commentary in
The lemmata contained in dictionaries which we call common nouns, designate what logicians refer to as universals. A label of a universal, like tree, indicates that we are dealing with something that naturally recurs, that we are speaking of a class of objects all of which can be so called at every recurrence. But in using universals we are also exhibiting our, that is our language’s, ways and principles of grouping or classifying natural recurrences\(^{127}\). Although in English we classify vegetables in part as trees, bushes, and herbs, according to their height, there is no logical or physical necessity for speakers of other languages to have arrived at the same principle of grouping vegetables. If in English, and in the Indo-European languages in general, the substance which chemists describe as \(\text{H}_2\text{O}\) may variously be called ice, hail, snow, water, rain, fog, steam, or vapor, other linguistic families need neither follow the same pattern, nor even know what \textit{ice}, or \textit{snow}, or \textit{rain}, may be. But proper names are not natural recurrences, and they are not principles of grouping or classifying, regardless of the language in which they occur: \textit{John}, the \textit{Empire State Building}, or \textit{York} do not recur, nor do they classify or group any natural recurrences, in the sense in which \textit{man}, \textit{building}, or \textit{city} do. In other words, proper names do not designate universals. It is to be noted, however, that each item bearing a proper name, a non-universal label, can be grouped as a member of some universal: \textit{John} is a \textit{man}, the \textit{Empire State Building} is a \textit{building}, \textit{York} is a \textit{city}. Yet the fact that \textit{city} occurs as an item in a dictionary, but \textit{York} as a heading in an encyclopedia or a gazetteer, in no way has any bearing on the meaningfulness or meaninglessness of \textit{York}. As I said before, meaninglessness of proper names is not different from meaningless in common nouns: it is caused, not by a quality inherent in the type of word, but by the ignorance of the hearer.

terms of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological philosophy may be found in M. Farber, The Foundation of Phenomenology (Cambridge Mass. 1943) 224: “Signs [Zeichen] in the sense of marks [Anzeichen] do not express [bedeuten] anything, unless they fulfill a meaning function besides the function of being a mark.” Ibid. 222: “A proper name is an expression [that is, in Husserl’s and Farber’s terminology, a significant sign] and not a sign like a chalk mark. In its manifesting function [that is, the function of linguistic expression], like all expressions, it also acts as a sign. But that is only an aid for the meaning function. In relation to the object a proper name is not a sign, for the named object does not have to exist. The distinction between connotative and non-connotative names has nothing to do with the difference between the significant and the meaningless. Mill’s distinction between that which a name denotes and that which it connotes should not be confused with the merely related difference between that which a name names and that which it means. This confusion appears to be promoted by Mill’s presentation.”

One becomes acquainted with proper names gradually, by hearing them and seeing them repeatedly (the technique of advertising comes to mind here: most products are identified by proper names — nobody sells just "automobiles", "cigarettes", "toothpaste") or by being introduced (in the wider sense) to their bearers. In the same manner, after all, one becomes acquainted with all common nouns, the sum of which, along with other categories of words, constitutes one's vocabulary. The deepening knowledge of an object also enlarges the number and enhances the intensity of connotations and associations potentially contained in the vocabulary. Our knowledge of these potential contents of words is at first absent or imperfect, then it either remains so or approaches perfection through learning: of all the people who use the term atomic power there are but few who know all that has been learned about it so far, and a great number who know nothing but the words, together with connotations of fear and hope in varying degrees. The problem of just how close one may come to perfection in knowing is one of epistemology and does not concern us here.

VI. Definition of the term proper name

We have seen that the "boundary" (in a synchronic as well as diachronic, genetic sense) between common and proper noun is, to say the least, fluctuating and elastic, and that we must resign ourselves to the fact that the difference is not one of kind, but of degree, of usage. This restriction excludes a priori all definitions and descriptions of proper name which rest on its purely grammatical features, its morphology, its use with or without the article, on its structuring pattern, and similar external criteria. It may be true that, in one or another language, one or several of such characteristics may appear attached to what is called, in that language, a proper name. But our interest is to discover, not what a language does, but how language behaves in the matter of proper names.

Bloomfield gives a perfectly valid distinction between name and common noun — valid, that is, in English; and he notes this restriction explicitly. He differentiates names and nouns thus\textsuperscript{128}:

1. Names
   a. Only in the singular
   b. Without determiner (this, a, some, each)
   c. Always definite
   d. Species of object contains only one specimen, but

\textsuperscript{128} L. Bloomfield, l. c. 205.
(1) Name may become noun by connecting it with a determiner: two Johns, a Mackintosh.

(2) Name may be preceded by the definite article: the Mississippi

2. Common nouns
   a. In singular and plural
   b. With determiner
   c. Definite and indefinite
   d. Species of object occurring in more than one specimen

All in all, Bloomfield offers here a distinction of form, grammar, and structure, which is the kind we preferred not to rely on. Therefore shortcomings become apparent under close scrutiny. If names do not appear in the plural, what about les Boileau, the Smiths, i Francesci? It has indeed been said that these plurals are not really proper names. But neither are they nouns, which they would have to be according to Bloomfield’s class 1d (1). As for determiners and definite and indefinite force, Bloomfield himself advises caution: “... space forbids our entering into details, such as class-cleavage by which a name occurs only as a common noun ...”129.

Bloomfield does not offer an explicit definition of the term proper name. Nor does Dauzat, who, like Bloomfield, notes several points which seem to be characteristic of names — not, however, without having bluntly stated at the very beginning of his book: “Délicate à établir, la distinction entre noms propres et noms communs est artificielle aux yeux du linguiste. Historiquement: car les noms propres, en dernière analyse, ont été créés avec des noms communs ou des adjectifs substantivés ... Logiquement, il est à peu près impossible de trouver une définition qui englobe tous les noms propres”130. Dauzat then enumerates a series of distinctive features by which others have tried either to define, or at least to describe, a name: “...le nom propre s’applique à un individu ou à une chose, le nom commun à un groupe”. Mais un prénom est susceptible de désigner de nombreux individus; un nom de lieu a souvent plusieurs homonymes”131. Besides, this way of reasoning leads us back exactly to the distinction based on singular and plural, which we have decided to discard: “On a cherché à préciser: le nom propre s’applique à un ou plusieurs individus pris en particulier, non à tous (P. Crouzet). Définition encore inexacte: il y a des noms propres collectifs, s’appliquant à tout un groupe (les Français) et des noms communs relatifs à un seul objet (le paradis,

129 Ibid.
130 A. Dauzat, Les Noms de personnes: origine et évolution (Paris 1925) 1.
131 Ibid.
le soleil). Et peut-on vraiment séparer certains noms propres de leur emploi adjectif, en dressant une cloison entre les Français et le langage français?

“On a prétendu que les noms propres ne sont pas traduits dans les langues étrangères: à quoi Michel Bréal a judicieusement répondu qu’il en est de même pour beaucoup de noms de dignités, d’inventions, de costumes, etc. . . .”132 Dauzat here quotes Bréal (p. 157) in a footnote: “On peut répondre également qu’à certaines époques les noms de personnes étrangers, qui avaient un sens apparent, ont bel et bien été traduits”133. He refers to such cases as Cerf from Hirsch, Piédelièvre from Hasenjuss, Poirier from Birnbaum. The great number of translated names among immigrants to the United States from non-English-speaking countries comes to mind here134.

But I rather think that Dauzat misses the point. In the instances of translation which he quotes we are actually dealing, not essentially with a translation, but with a complete change of name to fit a new environment, a change whereby the person relinquishes his old name altogether, so that it is, for a variety of reasons (sometimes fraudulent), condemned to oblivion. The retention of a lexical meaning through a formal translation is only incidental. A true translation neither necessitates nor aims at the loss or eradication of the original. In this sense, then, proper names are not as a rule translated135. “On a allégué aussi que les noms propres suivent les transformations phonétiques d’une marche plus lente que les noms communs: c’est complètement inexacte. A diverses époques, tels d’entre eux sont refaits, et recrées sur un modèle plus ancien (par exemple nos prénoms d’après le latin), mais c’est là un phénomène d’une toute autre nature, analogue à la création des mots savants. Et si une graphie archaïque peut arriver à exercer un choc en retour sur la prononciation des noms de famille, voire des noms de lieux, il s’agit ici encore d’un

133 Dauzat, l. c. 1–2.
135 They may be easily adapted, however, to a foreign tongue in pronunciation, or in spelling, or, most commonly, in both. Note how, for example, biblical and classical names appear in a variety of spellings and pronunciations in different languages, often modified acoustically to the point of unintelligibility to a foreigner.
136 For example, see J. Vendryes, Le Langage (Paris 1921) 73: “Il est de fait que les noms propres résistent souvent mieux que les autres aux altérations phonétiques qui résultent de changements combinatoires.” See also the quotation below, at n. 145.
fait d'ordre très général qui atteint, à l'époque contemporaine, toutes les parties du vocabulaire”.

“La présence ou l'absence de l'article devant le nom n'est pas plus caractéristique. Le nom commun se passe de ce compagnon en mainte circonstance: apostrophe, proverbes, aphorismes généraux.” All these suggestions for definition have to be refuted by Dauzat as fast as they are cited, because they all establish a definition or description of proper name on grammatical criteria. It must be conceded that “il n'existe entre les noms propres et les noms communs qu'une différence de degré, intellectuelle et non grammaticale”. This conclusion I had also reached by considering the material of which names are made, rather than their grammar.

Many people know that biologically a whale is not a fish (although called in German Walfish), but a mammal. It is so classified because it bears living young. While it is not probable, it is indeed conceivable that a pseudo-naturalist will arise to assert that the whale can be no mammal because, say, mammals do not live continuously in the water. “What is it then, if it is neither mammal nor fish?” “Well, it is — a whale”.

In other words, a more fundamental criterion of a biological order, a more compelling basis of distinction in every respect, has been rejected for the sake of a relatively insignificant impressionistic detail, insignificant, that is, in view of our aim, which is to classify the whale biologically and not according to its habitat. In the same manner, a name is really but a noun that has among other nouns, like the whale among other mammals, its striking peculiarities. What are these peculiarities, what are these differentiae specificae?

A linguist gives this definition: “Nomina propria sind Etiketten oder Ordnungszeichen, die gedanklich den Individuen zum Unterschied von anderen anhaften wie die Büchersignaturen in einer Bibliothek .... Eigennamen sind Individualnamen, die eine Individualvorstellung (sei es eines einzelnen Gegenstandes oder eines individuellen Kollektivs) bedeuten und zu deren Bedeutung weiter die Vorstellung des 'so und so Genanntseins' gehört; sie nennen Individuen oder individuelle Kollektiva, die existieren oder als existierend gedacht werden (wurden)”.

Another linguist says: “A proper name is a word or a group of words recognized as indicating or tending to indicate the object or objects to which it refers by virtue of its distinctive sound alone, without regard

137 But see above, p. 25.
138 Dauzat, I. c. 2.
139 Ibid. 3.
140 O. Funke, I. c. 77, 79.
to any meaning possessed by that sound from the start, or acquired by it through association with the said object or objects. This seems better, because in this definition a proper name is acknowledged to be a word (most likely a noun, or a word or phrase used substantively) that has a very particular task to fulfill. It is also emphasized that it does so by its sound alone — and that is its idiosyncracy, as it is the whale’s to live in the water. Gardiner would even go so far as to suggest that any name which also has dictionary value, that is, which has a common-noun meaning besides naming something, is less properly a proper name, “because for listeners ignorant of the object to which they [the less properly personal names] refer, the meaning thus afforded might provide some identificatory help. For instance, a sharp-witted peasant who knew Weymouth, but had never heard of Dartmouth, might, as we say, put two and two together, and conclude that a town was intended. [Although he would be out of luck with Dartmouth College.] And for exactly the same reason names like John and Mary, Heinrich and Giovanni, Freiburg and Deauville are less pure proper names than the purest because of the assistance that, on rare occasions, they might give by their suggestion of sex, nationality, or country.

I might agree that in proper names it is the sound and not the dictionary value that makes them meaningful. But it is unjustified to affirm that certain names are less properly proper names because of their obvious dictionary value, which might give a clue to the character of the object named. After all, there is at the bottom of each name a dictionary value which, however unrecognizable or overgrown it may be today, at one time was obvious to the speakers. Furthermore, the awareness of the inherent meaning will vary with different individuals: most persons might not give a second thought to a name like Wainwright and would not worry at all about what it means; some few might try to find out; and another few, those of a philological bent, will instantly and automatically on hearing it be conscious of its etymology. Even the name Smith rolls off the tongues of thousands without their ever thinking of a smith. A Hungarian ignorant of Latin or any Romance language will not derive the slightest information from the name Monte Bianco, but a Frenchman, a Spaniard, perhaps also an Englishman, or anyone knowing Latin, will understand, with more or less effort, that he is hearing talk of a white mountain. Therefore, while we may maintain that with proper names the acoustic appearance alone is the bearer of the meaning, it is idle to assert that those names which have in addition a general exchange value

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141 A. H. Gardiner, I. c. 43.
142 Ibid.
in a language are less pure. Purity is much too subjective a concept, conditioned entirely in this instance by the linguistic and the intellectual capacity of the receiver.\footnote{For other definitions and their discussion see Gardiner, l. c. 66-67.}

Here is the testimony of a pioneer of semasiology: “... pour cette catégorie [proper names] le sens étymologique n’est d’aucune valeur; de plus, ils passent d’une langue à l’autre sans être traduits; enfin ils suivent généralement les transformations phonétiques d’une marche plus lente. Néanmoins on peut dire qu’entre les noms propres et les noms communs il n’y a qu’une différence de degré. Ils sont, pour ainsi dire, des signes à la seconde puissance. ... l’on peut conclure qu’au point de vue sémantique les noms propres sont les substantifs par excellence.”\footnote{That is, to explain their function, not their origin or content.}

“Signes à la seconde puissance,” “substantifs par excellence” — these sound like terms to which this whole discussion has pointed. In an ideal language, which would presuppose ideal intelligence on the part of all of its speakers, there might be no common nouns, but names only in their stead. That is, every entity would have its proper name, every noun would be one par excellence. This does not sound practical, but it might be quite wonderful, in many respects, if one were no longer compelled always to use such generalities as horse, tree, but could give virtually every specimen of every species the most unambiguous, unmistakable name. Of course, it would be at least equally desirable to retain generic terms, that is, common nouns, for those numerous occasions when a generic statement is intended. Indeed, considering the limitations of the human intellect and human needs, we must be thankful for being intelligent enough to have produced general terms, universals, abstractions.

I have had occasion to characterize the change from noun to name by a decrease of extensive and an increase of intensive meaning, that from name to noun by an increase of extensive and a decrease of intensive meaning. Hence, a common noun’s potential meaning as a rule exceeds its actual signification on occurrence in context, and to have it fulfill the desired narrower function it will be necessary to have it accompanied by a determiner, a modifier: this man, her sister, the king of England, the city of Chicago, the highest tree in the world. If these determiners are omitted, the term becomes general, comprehensive to such a degree as to be vague and often inoperative. On the other hand, we may, at the expense of its comprehensiveness and extensiveness, increase its intensity\footnote{Bréal, l. c. 197-198.}.
on occasion and make it a proper noun in function, thus: "Gentlemen, the King!", "Let's go to the City". Conversely, a proper name's potential meaning does not exceed its actual meaning; in fact, the two coincide. Therefore the proper name will need no determiner for specification; it is as specific as it can be, since it includes all potential referents of the word (although this does not imply that it cannot, or must not, have determiners). It is true that the addition of a determiner may start the name on its way to becoming functionally a common noun, but it is not implied that this goal is necessarily reached. If I say „Achilles“, the potential meaning (which is Hermann Paul’s "usuelle Bedeutung") is congruent with the actual meaning (or Hermann Paul’s “okkasionelle Bedeutung”). As soon as the actual meaning is exceeded by the potential meaning — for example, by saying “the Achilles of German legend” — the word is again on its way to assuming the functions of a common noun. A proper name, then, has a meaning content, or better a referent content, that is identical in every instance of its use, whereas the identity of the referent content of a common noun may vary.

The formal criteria of distinction between names and non-names are not the same in all languages. But for the purpose of describing one certain language they are perfectly valid and sufficient, and they obviously are significant to the speaker. However, knowing that some languages or dialects do not make a formal distinction between name and non-name (especially noun), and that some other idioms do not even dispose of the linguistic apparatus and the categories to make grammatical differentiation feasible, must we therefore assume that the speaker cannot be conscious of the difference between the naming function and the appellative function? English does not formally distinguish between mass-nouns like sand and entity-nouns like grain (of sand); yet the speaker of English knows that it takes a plurality of grains to make sand — although sand is constructed as a singular. Chinese has no form classes to indicate tenses; yet the speaker of Chinese can of course distinguish past, present, and future time. Is it not therefore plausible that despite the absence of a formal distinction between name and non-name the speaker knows that there exists a functional extralinguistic difference? True, linguistic categories should not be defined philosophically.

But if we are dealing with extralinguistic general categories, such as time,

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146 Cf. H. Paul, l.c. 75: "Die okkasionelle Bedeutung ist sehr gewöhnlich an Inhalt reicher, an Umfang enger als die usuelle", and, p. 76: "Usuelle kann die Bedeutung eines Wort mehrfach sein, okkasionell ist sie immer einfach...." I prefer referend, over the more common referent, for obvious reasons.

147 Bloomfield, l.c. 271.
plurality and singularity, proper-naming and common-naming function, is it not permissible, indeed necessary, to seek a solution in extralinguistic nongrammatical arguments? Throughout the present investigation of names, formal, grammatical criteria have not been indiscriminately or lightly rejected in favor of historical, semantic, and philosophical considerations. The former deliver, I repeat, valid enough results for each dialect separately. But they do fail to furnish universally applicable principles. In other words, names must be classed not with such items as "nounlike and verb-like form-classes, categories of number, person, case, and tense, or grammatical positions of actor, verbal goal, and possessor"148, which are not general but vary from language to language, but rather with such factors as "phonemes, morphemes, words, sentences, constructions, and substitution-types [which] appear in every language"149. Hence they should be regarded as general characteristics of human speech and of mankind.

I therefore submit the following definition (in terms of function, not of form) for proper name: A proper name is a noun used κατ ἐξοχήν, in a non-universal function, with or without recognizable current lexical value, of which the potential meaning coincides with and never exceeds its actual meaning, and which is attached as a label to one animate being or one inanimate object (or to more than one in the case of collective names) for the purpose of specific distinction from among a number of like or in some respects similar beings or objects that are either in no manner distinguished from one another or, for our interest, not sufficiently distinguished.

148 Ibid. 297.
149 Ibid.